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The Other Side of Garcia: 
The Right of Publicity and Copyright Preemption 
 
Jennifer E. Rothman* 
The subject of my talk is a perfect transition from the two prior talks, and a 
perfect place to end an entire symposium about Copyright Outside the Box—by 
literally getting out of the copyright box entirely, and talking about the right of 
publicity and its intersection with copyright law.  I want to begin by thanking Jane 
Ginsburg for inviting me and encouraging me to participate, despite the fact that 
I’m stepping way outside the box.  I also want to thank everyone here at the 
Kernochan Center, and the students of the Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 
for putting this all together. 
June Besek started off this panel by describing it as being about “If authorship, 
what then?” and my twist on this question is, “If not authorship, what then?”  Or 
perhaps instead the turn is toward thinking about authorship in a different way:  
Are we talking about the author of the underlying film or the underlying work, or 
instead, are we perhaps talking about a different type of authorship—meaning 
authorship over oneself, one’s name, or one’s likeness?  This latter notion of being 
the author of oneself is the purview of the right of publicity.   
Perhaps another way of thinking about my topic is that co-panelist Jay 
Dougherty’s film producers should still be worried even though they ultimately 
won in the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing of Garcia v. Google, Inc.1  Or, yet another lens 
to consider, is to pick up where my other co-panelist, Eva Subotnik, left off—
perhaps the actors and the subjects of photographs have another avenue of asserting 
their rights, other than copyright law. 
The title of this talk is “The Other Side of Garcia.”  The “other side” is the right 
of publicity, and its interface with copyright, and in particular with the doctrine of 
copyright preemption.  This intersection or really conflict between the two laws 
was actually at the heart of Garcia v. Google, although it is rarely talked about in 
the context of the case. 
When Cindy Lee Garcia, the plaintiff and actress in the case, initially filed a 
lawsuit against the filmmaker, she did so in state court, and her complaint didn’t 
have a copyright claim at all; it had a right of publicity claim, and privacy-based 
 
 * © 2016 Jennifer E. Rothman.  Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law 
School, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles.  These remarks are adapted from the transcript of a 
talk that was given on October 2, 2015, at the Kernochan Center Annual Symposium at Columbia Law 
School.  
 1. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that actress was not likely to 
succeed in claim that her performance in a short film was an independently copyrightable contribution). 
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claims.2  When it was refiled in federal court with additional plaintiffs, including 
Google, a right of publicity claim was still lurking in there, but Garcia did not 
include that cause of action in her complaint.3  Now Jay said Garcia couldn’t have 
brought a right of publicity claim against Google.  Well, she could, but the problem 
is, as he said, the Communications Decency Act (CDA), section 230.4  The Ninth 
Circuit has decided that under the CDA Google cannot be liable for third party 
speech that violates the right of publicity.5  Other courts in other circuits have not 
so held.6  So I want to put out there, that there is not uniform agreement with the 
Ninth Circuit that service providers are immunized from right of publicity claims.  
What Garcia really wanted in this instance was for the film, The Innocence of 
Muslims, to be taken down, so the right of publicity was not the right avenue for 
that, at least under California law in the Ninth Circuit.  As a result, however, her 
right of publicity claim was never decided by the Ninth Circuit or to date by any 
other court. 
Nevertheless, if you read the Ninth Circuit opinion in the en banc decision very 
carefully, you could not be hit more clearly over the head with a right of publicity 
claim.  I have pulled out a couple of evocative quotes from the opinion, but there 
are many.  The court takes pains to explain that its “conclusion [that Garcia is not 
an author] does not mean a plaintiff like Garcia is without options, or that she could 
not have sought an injunction against different parties on other legal theories, like 
the right of publicity and defamation.”7  In another place, the opinion says, 
“[p]rivacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to Garcia’s personal 
and reputational harms.”8 
These two quotes demonstrate how clearly the majority in this decision thought 
Garcia had a right of publicity claim, or privacy-based claim.  Such claims were 
mentioned almost ten times in the opinion. The court was essentially saying:  
“We’re not saying she doesn’t have a lawsuit; she really does.  We feel really bad 
for her, and she can win, but not against Google here, because the film industry 
scared us with all of its amicus briefs about the parade of horribles that would 
follow a decision that an actor owns a copyright in her performance.”9 
So, what does this mean that the Ninth Circuit thinks Garcia has a right of 
publicity violation?  Well, this is a problem, and this really presents a collision 
course with copyright law, and this is something I’ve thought a lot about, and 
considered, and because this is a copyright conference, I’ll just remind people, in 
case you’ve forgotten, what the right of publicity is.  It’s a state-based tort that 
 
 2. Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sep. 19, 2012). 
 3. See Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV12-8315-MWF (C.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2012); see also 
Garcia v. Nakoula, First Amended Complaint, No. CV12-8315-MWF (C.D. Cal., Oct. 4, 2012). 
 4. 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
 5. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 6. See, e.g., Gauck v. Karamian, 805 F. Supp.2d 495 (W.D. Tenn. 2011); Stayart v. Yahoo!, 651 
F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
 7. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740–41. 
 8. Id. at 745. 
 9.  I do not think the Ninth Circuit was wrong on this point, but the quick shift from the panel 
decision to the en banc reversal was no doubt driven in part by the outcry from Hollywood. 
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prevents others from using your name or likeness, and sometimes other indicia of 
your identity without permission in various contexts.  The right of publicity differs 
in every state, which is crazy.  I’ve just launched a website in which I provide a 
survey of all fifty states using an interactive website that provides guidance on each 
state’s laws.10  So you can click on your state, or whatever state you want to know 
about, and find out about the law in that state. 
One of the problems with all the different state laws is that it is difficult to 
provide an all-encompassing definition of the right of publicity given the wide 
variations among states.  It is therefore hard to boil down what the right of publicity 
is across all the states, without using a very broad definition.  The law allows 
people to control the use of their identities; sometimes this is limited to control over 
names or likenesses, but sometimes only limited to anything that reminds people of 
the person.  Sometimes the right of publicity is limited to commercial uses, 
sometimes it’s not.  Sometimes it’s limited to commercial speech and particularly 
to advertising, and sometimes it’s not.  Some states expressly exclude expressive 
works from the tort’s reach, but many others do not.  The broader the right of 
publicity is, the more likely that we’re going to have a collision course with 
copyright. 
One of the reasons that the right of publicity and copyright law are increasingly 
in conflict is that we have an expanding reach of the right of publicity.  And I say 
expanding perhaps with a little bit of overselling because in some sense it’s simply 
that we’ve forgotten how expansive the right of publicity is, or we pretend that it’s 
not as expansive as it is. 
One of the ways that the right of publicity is broader than we often think is what 
I call the “commercial speech fallacy.”  People often say, “Well, the right of 
publicity is just limited to commercial speech, advertising about commercial 
products.  Let’s not lose sleep over it.”  J. T. McCarthy, who’s the leading treatise 
writer on the right of publicity, says that’s the case.11  But, it’s not true.  The right 
of publicity is limited to commercial speech in only a very few jurisdictions.  For 
those who want to read more about it, I have an article that was just published in 
the Virginia Law Review titled, “Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the 
Intellectual Property Quagmire.”12  That article reaches much more broadly than 
the right of publicity, to copyright and trademark, but in the right of publicity 
context, I highlight in the article the myriad right of publicity cases that have 
succeeded outside of commercial speech.  These cases often arise in the heartland 
of copyright and involve expressive works.  The right of publicity, for example, has 
stopped uses in comic books,13 and in video games, such as in the recent decisions 
 
 10. Jennifer Rothman, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 
www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com [https://perma.cc/ATZ6-6QX2].  The website also provides breaking 
news and commentary on the right of publicity. 
 11. See, e.g., J. T. McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture – The Human Persona 
as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 131 (1995).  
 12. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property 
Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929 (2015). 
 13.  See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003). 
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in the Davis and Keller cases.14  There’s a pending right of publicity lawsuit in the 
Ninth Circuit that’s stuck in some outer circle of hell involving the movie, The Hurt 
Locker, where there is a lawsuit by the person upon whom the main character 
allegedly was based.  If this lawsuit succeeds, its logic could apply to The 
Innocence of Muslims and Garcia’s claims there, as well as to many other movies.15 
Another avenue of expansion of the right of publicity is to cover characters and 
the underlying actors who play those characters.  It is difficult to refer to a character 
without evoking the actor who played that character.  Such associations have been 
held in some jurisdictions to provide a basis for liability under right of publicity 
laws, whether in the context of action figures, or robots.  For example, Vanna 
White successfully brought a right of publicity suit not for the use of her likeness, 
but for the use of a robot with a wig that made people say “Hey!  That makes me 
think of Vanna White.”16 
Similarly, John Ratzenberger and George Wendt, who were the actors who 
played the characters Cliff Clavin and Norm Peterson in the hit sitcom series 
Cheers, successfully moved forward with a suit arising out of the use of robots in 
an airport bar that evoked those characters.  The characters had been licensed by 
the copyright holder of the Cheers series.17  The robots were called Hank and Bob, 
not Norm and Cliff, though the names appear to have been changed after the 
defendant, Host International, was threatened with suit.  The district court had held 
that the robots did not look like John Ratzenberger or George Wendt, but you can 
imagine that if you see two men in a bar that’s from the Cheers set, one dressed as 
a mail carrier, and the other in a suit, you’re going to go, “Hey, that’s Norm, and 
hey, that’s Cliff, oh, that reminds me of those actors from Cheers.”   
Another similar example includes a case involving Spanky McFarland of Our 
Gang fame, who sued a restaurant for displaying posters from Our Gang which 
were lawfully purchased, but that he claimed illegally used the actor’s identity in a 
commercial setting.18 
These cases and the expansion of right of publicity laws raise a number of 
concerns, notably a conflict with copyright law—the subject of this conference. 
Each example raises a specific conflict with copyright law.  Some conflicts arise 
with the original copyright holder and potentially limit the rights of distribution, 
performance, display, and sale, as well as the production or licensing of derivative 
 
 14. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (“Keller v. Electronic 
Arts”), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2015); Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 15. The district court’s dismissal was recently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.  Sarver v. Hurt 
Locker, LLC, No. 2-10 Civ. 01076, 2010 WL 4810813 (D. N.J. Nov. 18, 2010), aff’d, Sarver v. 
Chartier, No. 11-56986 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2016).  Nevertheless, the logic of Keller and Davis extends to 
uses in motion pictures.  For a more detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Sarver see 
my commentary, Ninth Circuit Tosses Hurt Locker Case, 
http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/ninth-circuit-tosses-hurt-locker-case 
[https://perma.cc/6R6C-C63P]. 
 16. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); see also White v. Samsung 
Elec. Am., Inc, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 17. Wendt v. Host Intern., Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 
  18. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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works, from merchandise to sequels, to prequels, to adaptations.  One could think 
of  the Garcia case as a derivative work case.  Even though we have the original 
copyright holder distributing the work, there may in fact be a derivative work at 
issue because it was reedited and Garcia’s performance was dubbed. 
The right of publicity also interferes with the public’s right to display lawfully 
purchased works, and to perform things like soundalikes which are authorized by 
the Copyright Act.  A number of right-of-publicity suits have successfully 
restricted soundalikes, and even just imitative voices, as well as the ability to 
display lawfully purchased works.19  And, of course, the right of publicity 
interferes with the public’s right to fairly use copyrighted works, because the right 
of publicity is much more expansive and has many fewer limitations that are 
speech-protective in contrast to copyright law. 
What can we do to rein in the right of publicity?  Well, a number of years ago 
(many now, it seems), I wrote an article about this coming collision in the U.C. 
Davis Law Review.20  In the 2002 article, I discussed that section 301, which is the 
explicit preemption provision in copyright law, actually doesn’t do much to help us 
out here.  Section 301 asks two questions to determine preemption.  First, is the 
state law equivalent to a right protected by copyright?; and second, does the work 
at issue fall within the subject matter of copyright?21 
The problem is that courts really don’t know how to interpret this provision.  
Various interpretations of each provision lead to extreme conclusions that the right 
of publicity is always preempted, or alternatively, that it is never preempted.  In the 
interest of time, I will take one example of such an absurd interpretation of § 301.  
One common interpretation is to conclude that if a law has an extra element, then it 
is not an equivalent right. So the right of publicity, we say, has an extra element 
because it’s about a person’s identity, or it’s for a commercial purpose.  If there’s 
such an extra element, the law is never preempted.  The problem with this 
interpretation is that the one thing we know that section 301 was supposed to 
preempt, based on clear legislative history, is common law copyright.  But common 
law copyright has an extra element—the works were supposed to be unpublished.  
So, that’s a confusing interpretation of section 301 and one that cannot be correct.  
It cannot be interpreted not to preempt the one thing we are certain it was meant to 
preempt. 
The other tack courts take is to consider if the state law is violated by an 
exercise of a section 106 right.22  In other words, are you distributing, copying, 
performing or displaying the original copyrighted work?  If you are, then we would 
have preemption.  Such an approach means that the right of publicity would almost 
 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b); see, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994); Waits v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing a right of publicity claim on the basis of a similarly 
styled vocal performance); Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing a right of publicity 
claim based on unauthorized use of a “sound alike” in a commercial that imitated the plaintiff’s voice).  
 20. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 199 (2002). 
 21. 17 U.S.C § 301.  
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
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always be preempted, because the use will almost always be in the context of a 
copyrighted work. 
The same problems arise when analyzing whether the state law fits within the 
subject matter of copyright.  One interpretation in the context of right of publicity 
laws is that the underlying work is the person’s identity which is not copyrightable 
so there is never preemption.  Other courts, however, have concluded that if the 
person’s identity is captured in a copyrightable work then it is always preempted.  
As you can see, section 301 is a big mess. 
One of the ways out of this big mess that I have proposed is to use conflict 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  Such an approach is 
permissible despite the explicit statutory provision because the statute does not 
exclude other preemption analysis.  Supremacy Clause preemption would focus on 
places where copyright and right of publicity laws conflict, and when the two laws 
conflict, the right of publicity should be preempted. 
In the more than a decade since I wrote the article on copyright preemption and 
the right of publicity, the law has not become any clearer.  Even though a couple of 
courts have taken my lead to consider conflict preemption, most have not and the 
law has remained mired in the uncertainties of the section 301 approach.  We have, 
up on the screen here, a host of cases involving performances being captured, in 
which courts found right of publicity claims preempted.23  Of particular interest 
here are some in which there was reediting of the underlying materials, such as in 
Dryer v. NFL, in which copyrighted footage was reedited and presented in a new 
work and new context.24  Or Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., in which a court 
held that a right of publicity claim was preempted by copyright law when the 
alleged violation was the capture of an employee’s voice on tape.  The underlying 
recording was done with permission, but the use in the videogame was not.25 
On the other hand, there are many cases in which courts held that the right of 
publicity was not preempted by copyright law.26  It’s hard to make heads or tails 
 
 23. See, e.g., Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 94 F. Supp.3d 
1128 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 24. Dryer v. National Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d No. 14-3428, -
- F.3d ---- (8th Cir.  Feb. 26, 2016).  For coverage of this recent decision see my commentary, Eighth 
Circuit Tosses NFL Players’ Lawsuit, http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-
commentary/eighth-circuit-tosses-nfl-players-lawsuit.[https://perma.cc/HW2Q-S9Q4].  There were also 
several earlier examples of preemption of performances.  See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding right of publicity claims 
preempted that arose out of use of performances by baseball players because teams owned copyright in 
telecasts of those performances); Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Fleet v. 
CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App.4th 1911 (1996).  Dryer, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (right of publicity claim against 
NFL for using historical footage of former players in television productions without permission). 
 25. Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc. No. C 12-1096, 2012 WL 5199505 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 
2012), aff’d, 2015 WL 9258962 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2015). 
 26. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008); Toney v. L’Oreal 
USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000); Dent v. 
Renaissance Mktg. Corp., No. 14 C-02999, 2015 WL 3484464 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 1, 2015); No Doubt v. 
Activision Publ’g, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No Civ. 
04-9484, 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
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out of these decisions.  There is often no basis to distinguish them.  Consider 
Facenda v. NFL Films.  In that case, a famous sports announcer’s voice was used—
taken from a lawful recording to which the defendant owned the copyright.  NFL 
Films then edited these works and reused his voice in a documentary film.  This use 
was found not to preempt Facenda’s right of publicity claim because the use was in 
a derivative work, even though in Dryer v. NFL a very similar use of preexisting 
footage of players was held preempted.27 
So, back to Garcia, and the other side of Garcia.  Would Garcia have a 
legitimate right of publicity claim?  First, would she have it against the filmmaker, 
Nakoula?  Well, he happens to be bankrupt and last I checked in jail, so he’s not a 
great defendant for her.  But in terms of people in Hollywood staying awake at 
night, she actually might have a claim if we read the tea leaves.  To be clear this is 
not normatively what I think should happen, because I think her claim should be 
preempted, but just reading the tea leaves from a legal realist perspective, let’s 
think about consent here.  The initial panel said she did not consent to the use of 
her performance in the film.28  She did not sign a contract, there was no implicit 
consent, and it was viewed as sort of a bait and switch about the nature of the work 
that she had agreed to appear in.29 
So I think Garcia might be viewed as not consenting to the use of her 
performance.  In most instances in which courts have considered right of publicity 
and preemption with copyright law, when there has not been consent by the actor or 
other identity-holder, courts have held that the right of publicity is not preempted.  
Such a possibility should be pretty concerning here, especially since in Hollywood 
you might start out making a drama, and then things don’t turn out how you 
planned and it looks like a pretty terrible drama, so you decide to turn it into a 
comedy in the cutting room.  Filmmakers need room for that to happen.  
Alternatively, you might want to dub over someone’s horrible performance.  
Anything like that can happen.  So it would be very troubling if an actor could sue 
for a right of publicity violation if their performance is altered or the underlying 
script changes dramatically in post-production. 
On the other hand, all is not lost.  Some things weigh against a right of publicity 
claim in Garcia, and instead weigh in favor of preemption.  First, the original 
copyright holder is using her performance, and is using it in the distribution of the 
original (even if altered) work, rather than a derivative work.  Second, she made a 
copyright claim, and even though her copyright ownership claim was ultimately 
rejected en banc by the Ninth Circuit, cases in which a plaintiff has pled both a 
copyright claim and a right of publicity claim have most often led to a conclusion 
that the latter is preempted.  So if you want to make a successful right of publicity 
claim, don’t also make a copyright claim, because that is bad for your chances.  
Also weighing in favor of preempting the claim here, the use is not an 
advertisement, and there’s no suggestion of false endorsement.  Although neither of 
 
 27. Compare Facenda, 542 F.3d 1007 with Dryer, 55 F.Supp.3d 1181. 
 28. Garcia v. Google, Inc. 766 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 29. Id.  
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those things really have anything to do with conflict preemption or with section 301 
preemption, courts often point to such features as a basis to reject preemption 
claims. 
So, back to our collision course:  the right of publicity presents serious problems 
for copyright holders and licensees.  Even though Garcia may not have a copyright 
claim, she may be able to claim “authorship” over her name and image in the film, 
a possibility that should resurrect Hollywood’s worst fears. 
As the threat of an expansive right of publicity grows, I want to alert you to 
some upcoming work that hopefully will be helpful to you as we navigate this 
future together.  If you’re interested in learning more about the right of publicity, 
its past, present and future, I have a book coming out on the right of publicity to be 
published by Harvard University Press, titled A Right is Born: The Right of 
Publicity, Celebrity and Privacy in a Public World.30  The book will consider the 
right’s collision course with copyright law, as well as its collision with the First 
Amendment.  The website that I mentioned earlier will also help navigate these 
treacherous waters, both by providing updated state laws, as well as news and 
commentary about the right of publicity.  It’s now available at 
www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com.  So, enjoy. 
 
 30.  JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, A RIGHT IS BORN: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, CELEBRITY, AND 
PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming 2017). 
